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1989 
TEAMWORK OR COLLUSION? CHANGING ANTITRUST 
LAW TO PERMIT CORPORATE ACTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
Dailey C. Koga* 
Abstract: In an era of apprehension about climate change and the future of our planet, 
private companies are increasingly recognizing their role in increasing sustainability and 
lowering carbon emissions. To address this growing concern, some industry leaders are taking 
unilateral action to implement sustainable practices, but other companies have made 
agreements to fight emissions together. However, the Sherman Antitrust Act forbids 
agreements in restraint of trade. Further, antitrust law traditionally has refused to recognize 
ethical or moral justifications as legitimate reasons to permit anticompetitive agreements. As 
society’s concern for the planet grows and elected leaders move slower than needed to address 
climate problems, private sector actions take on a special urgency—especially given the 
massive carbon emissions stemming from corporate activities. This Comment reexamines the 
constructs and restrictions of antitrust law and identifies a solution that will allow companies 
to enter agreements aimed at addressing climate change while still upholding antitrust law’s 
primary goal: consumer welfare. Specifically, this Comment proposes an exemption to 
antitrust law for agreements addressing climate change based on new Dutch guidelines and 
also provides a framework for companies to combat antitrust challenges to sustainability 
agreements absent an explicit exemption. 
INTRODUCTION 
In July 2019, four automakers—Ford, Volkswagen of America, Honda, 
and BMW—struck a deal with California to decrease automobile 
emissions.1 The deal emerged after the Trump administration announced 
plans to roll back federal emissions standards from about fifty-five miles 
per gallon to about thirty-seven miles per gallon.2 The deal resulted in a 
new California law that sets emissions standards at fifty-one miles per 
gallon by the year 2026.3 The automakers supported this law because the 
higher standards would create more certainty about future emissions 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank 
Professor Douglas Ross for his invaluable guidance and insight throughout the drafting process. 
Additional thanks to the editorial staff of Washington Law Review for their thoughtful suggestions 
and incredible attention to detail. 
1. Coral Davenport & Hiroko Tabuchi, Automakers, Rejecting Trump Pollution Rule, Strike a Deal 
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standards, which they use to project car manufacturing needs.4 Given the 
transportation sector’s contribution to carbon emissions, this agreement 
could help reduce CO2 levels globally.5 Despite the benefits of the deal, 
the Department of Justice (DOJ or Justice Department) opened an 
investigation in September of the same year to determine whether the 
automakers violated antitrust laws.6 
The DOJ subsequently closed its investigation in February 2020 
without comment or explanation.7 Four months later, a whistleblower 
from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division testified in front of the 
House Judiciary Committee about his concerns over some of the DOJ’s 
recent antitrust investigations, including the automaker investigation.8 
The Assistant Attorney General for the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, Makan 
Delrahim, responded with a letter, which made clear that the DOJ closed 
the investigation because the automakers had never entered into 
an agreement.9 
Despite the Justice Department’s termination of the inquiry, the 
investigation still raises questions for agreements involving moral or 
social considerations—specifically those aimed at addressing 
environmental problems. Litigants have repeatedly tried to establish an 
exemption for moral or social considerations in Sherman Act analysis.10 
But the Supreme Court made it clear in National Society of Professional 
Engineers v. United States11 and FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
 
4. Id. 
5. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, the United States contributes 15% of global 
carbon emissions. See Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY 
[hereinafter Emissions Data], https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-
data [https://perma.cc/HR43-LJDN]. Moreover, emissions from transportation make up 28% of the 
United States’ emissions. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma.cc/CNG8-
9TY7]. 
6. Hiroko Tabuchi & Coral Davenport, Justice Dept. Investigates California Emissions Pact that 
Embarrassed Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/06/ 
climate/automakers-california-emissions-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/P887-LRNF]. 
7. Coral Davenport, Justice Department Drops Antitrust Probe Against Automakers that Sided with 
California on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/07/climate/ 
trump-california-automakers-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/5FEK-PLPK]. 
8. See Oversight of the Department of Justice: Political Interference and Threats to Prosecutorial 
Independence: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter DOJ 
Oversight Hearing] (statements of John Elias). 
9. Letter from Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., to 
Honorable Jerrold Nadler, Chairman, and Honorable Jim Jordan, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary (July 1, 2020), https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000173-0d14-dd78-a9ff-7fb6e2a70000 
[https://perma.cc/SAL5-C9YC]. 
10. See infra section II.B. 
11. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
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Ass’n12 that non-economic considerations have no place in Sherman Act 
analysis.13 While some lower courts have appeared to consider non-
economic factors when they are cleverly framed in economic terms,14 the 
Supreme Court has consistently applied the precedent from National 
Society of Professional Engineers and Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
over time.15 
As the threat of climate change continues to loom, finding a path 
forward has proven exceedingly difficult. Major corporations contribute a 
significant amount to climate change but have done little to combat it.16 
However, that could soon change. Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock 
Investments, issued his annual letter to CEOs in January 2020 in which he 
recognized the impact of climate change on business and investment.17 He 
also vowed BlackRock’s commitment to addressing sustainability.18 This 
letter served as a kind of call to action, spurring other large companies to 
issue statements regarding their own commitment to climate change.19 But 
while a company like BlackRock—which manages almost $7 trillion in 
investments20—can afford to allocate significant resources to 
 
12. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
13. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 694–95; Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 
at 421–22.  
14. See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678–79 (3d Cir. 1993) (ordering the district 
court to perform a full rule of reason analysis to consider the argument that collusion was necessary 
to help individuals with lower socioeconomic statuses access Ivy League educations). 
15. See Makan Delrahim, DOJ Antitrust Division: Popular Ends Should Not Justify Anti-
Competitive Collusion, USA TODAY (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story 
/opinion/2019/09/12/doj-antitrust-division-popular-ends-dont-justify-collusion-editorials-
debates/2306078001/ [https://perma.cc/5PGX-644M] (op-ed from the Assistant Attorney General of 
the DOJ’s Antitrust Division justifying the agency’s inquiry into an agreement among auto 
manufacturers and California, stating “[e]ven laudable ends do not justify collusive means in our 
chosen system of laws”). 
16. See, e.g., Matthew Taylor & Jonathan Watts, Revealed: The 20 Firms Behind a Third of All 
Carbon Emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 9, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 
2019/oct/09/revealed-20-firms-third-carbon-emissions [https://perma.cc/4B9P-88FJ] (stating that 
just twenty private companies “can be directly linked to more than one-third of all greenhouse gas 
emissions in the modern era”). 




19. See, e.g., Amelia Lucas, Starbucks Aims to Become ‘Resource Positive’ in Climate Push, 
CNBC (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/21/starbucks-aims-to-become-resource-
positive-in-climate-push.html [https://perma.cc/C5DP-BJAJ] (discussing Starbucks’s intent to 
become resource positive and to implement sustainable changes by 2030). 
20. Andrew Ross Sorkin, BlackRock C.E.O. Larry Fink: Climate Crisis Will Reshape Finance, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/14/business/dealbook/larry-fink-
blackrock-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/PBN5-S3FZ]. 
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sustainability programs, smaller companies may not have that luxury if 
they are forced to act independently. Permitting agreements between 
companies to further sustainability programs may enable smaller 
companies to join in the fight toward a greener future. 
This Comment proposes a path forward that would allow companies to 
enter into agreements while still respecting the fundamental goals of 
antitrust law.21 Specifically, this Comment argues that the most 
appropriate channel for change would be a congressional exemption for 
sustainability agreements. This Comment further lays out a way for 
litigants to frame sustainability agreements so that they may survive 
antitrust scrutiny. Part I of this Comment explains section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, its history and purpose, and its application. Part II discusses 
previous attempts to create exemptions to antitrust law based on moral 
concerns such as building-safety or quality of legal representation. This 
Part also describes how other countries currently permit sustainability 
agreements within their antitrust laws. Part III provides an overview of 
the role of business in the environmental crisis, highlighting the potential 
impact that corporate action could have on climate change. Looking to 
other countries for guidance, Part IV proposes a congressional exemption. 
It then discusses a framework for litigants to use when defending 
sustainability agreements in antitrust litigation absent a 
congressional exemption.22 
I. SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act makes illegal “[e]very contract, 
 
21. This Comment focuses on climate change considerations in Sherman Act section 1 analysis and 
does not consider potential climate change antitrust violations related to other antitrust laws such as 
section 2 of the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act. Separate questions may arise if climate change or 
carbon emissions were to be considered in evaluating violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act or 
under other antitrust laws like the Clayton Act. 
22. Arguments to allow environmental concerns or other moral concerns to play a role in antitrust 
law have been presented before. See, e.g., David Andrews, Antitrust Law Meets the Environmental 
Crisis—An Argument for Accommodation, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 840 (1971). The Antitrust Section of the 
American Bar Association has also examined the intersection of environmental issues and antitrust 
law in the past. See generally Env’t L. Comm., Am. Bar Ass’n, Report of the Committee on Antitrust 
Aspects of Environmental Law, 45 ANTITRUST L.J. 355 (1976). One recent article also discusses the 
intersection of U.S. antitrust law and environmental concerns. See generally Paul Balmer, Colluding 
to Save the World: How Antitrust Laws Discourage Corporations from Taking Action on Climate 
Change, 47 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 219 (2020). Balmer’s Article furthers the conversation but 
provides a much broader overview than this Comment. See generally id. This Comment builds on 
Balmer’s Article in many ways, going into further depth on section 1 violations, proposing a specific 
congressional exemption based on the new Dutch guidelines, and providing a framework for litigants 
hoping to survive antitrust scrutiny. The concept should continue to be examined and looked at in a 
serious manner as the search for solutions to the climate crisis intensifies and as governments globally 
are not doing enough to curb climate change. 
Koga (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2020  10:34 PM 
2020] CHANGING ANTITRUST LAW 1993 
 
combination[,] . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.”23 
Courts broadly agree that section 1 cannot be read literally to prohibit 
every agreement in restraint of trade because that would restrict nearly all 
agreements made in the course of business.24 The Act thus only prohibits 
persons and organizations from entering into agreements that have 
anticompetitive effects.25 Anticompetitive effects typically include higher 
prices or lower output but can also include a decrease in innovation or 
other economic harms to consumers.26 The primary purpose of the 
Sherman Act and antitrust law is to protect competition.27 Congress and 
courts have created a number of exceptions to section 1 including 
exceptions for sports leagues,28 labor unions,29 and states.30 Courts have 
also held that agreements or actions protected by the First Amendment are 
exempt from antitrust law.31 
A. Section 1 of the Sherman Act Forbids Agreements in Restraint 
of Trade 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids agreements among individuals or 
companies that have anticompetitive effects.32 Some conduct between or 
among competitors, like price-fixing and market-allocation, is per se 
illegal under the Sherman Act.33 Courts evaluate other types of conduct 
under a rule of reason analysis, weighing the conduct’s anticompetitive 
effects with any procompetitive justifications.34 Procompetitive 
justifications often involve legitimate business reasons for entering into 
 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
24. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 98 (1984) (“[E]very contract is a restraint of trade, and as we have 
repeatedly recognized, the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit only unreasonable restraints 
of trade.”). 
25. AM. BAR ASS’N, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 2 (8th ed. 2017) [hereinafter 
DEVELOPMENTS]. 
26. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1979) 
(considering the innovative nature of blanket licenses to copyrighted music as a procompetitive 
justification for an agreement that restrained trade). 
27. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the 
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not 
competitors . . . .”). 
28. See Fed. Baseball Club, Inc. v. Nat’l League of Pro. Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). 
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 17; United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). 
30. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). 
31. See E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961). 
32. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 2. 
33. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
34. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 343–44 (1982). 
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certain agreements but cannot include ethical or moral considerations.35 
Under the rule of reason, the court weighs the anticompetitive effects with 
the procompetitive justifications to determine whether the conduct is 
unlawful under the Sherman Act.36 
For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting 
System, Inc.,37 two licensing agencies sold blanket licenses to copyrighted 
music.38 Blanket licenses allowed consumers to purchase rights to use all 
of the songs licensed by the music agency for one fixed price rather than 
having to purchase rights to each individual song.39 CBS challenged the 
licenses, arguing in part that they amounted to illegal price-fixing because 
they effectively made the license-price for each song equal.40 After 
holding that this was not per se unlawful price-fixing, the Supreme Court 
remanded the case, instructing the lower court to conduct a full rule of 
reason analysis.41 The Court reasoned that the blanket licenses were a 
practical solution to a fundamental problem in the market—consumers 
could save time and money by purchasing a blanket license rather than a 
separate license for each song they wanted to use.42 
Sometimes courts apply a level of scrutiny that falls in between a per 
se analysis and a rule of reason analysis, known as a “quick look” 
analysis.43 Courts apply a quick look analysis when a restraint is 
“sufficiently anticompetitive on [its] face that [it does] not require a full-
blown rule of reason inquiry.”44 In a quick look analysis, if direct evidence 
reveals that an agreement has anticompetitive effects, such as raising 
prices or reducing quantity, the court will invalidate the agreement absent 
a procompetitive justification, without doing a full market analysis.45 In 
other words, the court will not spend time determining the agreement’s 
relevant market and the agreement’s effects on that market if the 
 
35. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 421–22 (1990) (“[I]t is not our 
task to pass upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements.”). 
36. See Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978). 
37. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
38. Id. at 5. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 6. 
41. Id. at 24–25. 
42. Id. at 21–22. 
43. See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying a “quick look” 
analysis because the restriction on annual compensation for coaches had obvious anticompetitive 
effects). For a more detailed account of “quick look” analysis, see generally Edward D. Cavanagh, 
Whatever Happened to Quick Look?, 26 U. MIA. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2017). 
44. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 763 (1999) (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 128 
F.3d 720, 727 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
45. See Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35–36 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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anticompetitive nature of the agreement is facially obvious.46 
First and foremost, section 1 requires an agreement.47 There is a distinct 
difference in antitrust law between what is known as “conscious 
parallelism” and an actual agreement in restraint of trade.48 Conscious 
parallelism encompasses activity undertaken by multiple firms who have 
not explicitly agreed to cooperate, but who instead watch each other and 
move simultaneously.49 A common example is that of two gas stations on 
opposite corners of an intersection. If one gas station changes its price, the 
other gas station would likely do the same. Although it would appear the 
two gas stations acted in concert, section 1 of the Sherman Act does not 
condemn such conduct without an actual agreement. 
It is often difficult to determine whether two firms entered into an 
actual agreement or whether they merely engaged in conscious 
parallelism. To determine whether an agreement exists, courts look for the 
presence of certain “plus factors.”50 Relevant plus factors may include 
(1) whether the firms have opportunities to communicate, such as trade 
association meetings;51 (2) whether the conduct the firms engaged in is 
too complicated to be explained by conscious parallelism;52 and 
 
46. Id. 
47. See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540–41 (1954). 
48. See id. at 541. 
49. See, e.g., id. at 541–42 (“[T]his Court has never held that proof of parallel business behavior 
conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently, that such behavior itself constitutes a 
Sherman Act offense.”). 
50. See William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus Factors 
and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 415 (2011) (explaining that Judge Richard 
Posner has listed fourteen cartel plus factors: “(1) Fixed relative market shares, (2) Marketwide price 
discrimination, (3) Exchanges of price information, (4) Regional price variations, (5) Identical bids 
for nonstandard products, (6) Price, output, and capacity changes at the formation of the cartel, 
(7) Industry-wide resale price maintenance, (8) Declining market shares of leaders, (9) Amplitude and 
fluctuation of price changes, (10) Demand elastic at the market price, (11) Level and pattern of profits, 
(12) Market price inversely correlated with number of firms or elasticity of demand, (13) Basing-
point pricing, (14) Exclusionary practices”). 
51. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining 
that trade association meetings can facilitate price fixing); DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 14–15 
(identifying meetings as evidence of an opportunity to collude). This plus factor is generally 
considered to carry less weight than others and is viewed as insufficient on its own to show collusion. 
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 14–15. 
52. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.4 (2007) (“‘[C]omplex and 
historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same time by multiple 
competitors, and made for no other discernable reason,’ would support a plausible inference of 
conspiracy.” (quoting Brief for Respondent at 37, Bell Atl., 550 U.S. 544 (No. 05-1126), 2006 WL 
3089915, at *37)). “Conscious parallelism” is sometimes also referred to as “tacit collusion.” 
Collusion, Tacit Collusion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (11th ed. 2019). 
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(3) whether the conduct lacks an explanation grounded in efficiency.53 
Courts also assess whether the industry has factors that make it more 
susceptible to explicit collusion.54 Often these factors speak to the 
industry’s ability to solve “cartel problems.”55 Cartel56 problems include 
agreeing on terms of the conspiracy, detecting and deterring cheating, and 
preventing new firms from entering the market.57 For example, cartels 
may have a difficult time reaching a consensus on price or output because 
some firms want a larger share of the market.58 They may also lack the 
ability to prevent new entrants into the market that could undercut 
the cartel.59 
Certain features of industries help cartels solve these common 
problems. Markets with few firms, large buyers, consistent demand, 
opportunities to communicate, difficult entry conditions, and transparent 
prices are thought to be more susceptible to conspiracy.60 Additionally, 
courts consider whether the industry has been subject to conspiracy in the 
past.61 When an industry has these particular features, courts are more 
likely to infer collusive activity.62 
Sharing information is particularly concerning in section 1 analysis as 
it provides a clear opportunity for collusion.63 Information sharing among 
competitors is not per se unlawful, but it can be used to infer an agreement 
to fix prices, or it can constitute a standalone violation of section 1.64 
 
53. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d at 628 (explaining that the defendants 
increased prices even when costs were falling without an economically sound explanation). 
54. Jonathan B. Baker, Exclusion as a Core Competition Concern, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 527, 529 
(2013). “Collusion” is a term of art used in antitrust jurisprudence to refer to anticompetitive 
coordination that violates antitrust law. See generally Price Fixing, Bid Rigging and Market 
Allocation Schemes, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/price-fixing-bid-rigging-and-
market-allocation-schemes [https://perma.cc/CYQ2-XU2F]. 
55. Baker, supra note 54, at 529 (explaining that “cartel problems” are “reaching consensus on 
terms of coordination, deterring cheating on those terms, and preventing new competition”).  
56. In antitrust jurisprudence, the term “cartel” is used to refer to a group of entities who agree to 
engage in anticompetitive conduct. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 592 (1986) (describing an agreement among conspirators to maintain prices above a 
competitive level as a price-fixing cartel). 
57. Baker, supra note 54, at 529. 
58. See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 43, 45–46 (2006). 
59. See id. at 49, 74–75. 
60. See id. at 49, 57, 61, 64, 69, 74–75. 
61. See id. at 67. 
62. See Kovacic et al., supra note 50, at 435. 
63. See, e.g., In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 628 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Of note is 
the allegation in the complaint that the defendants belonged to a trade association and exchanged price 
information directly at association meetings.”). 
64. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198–99 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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Courts consider a number of factors when determining whether an 
exchange of information violates the Sherman Act, such as the type of 
information exchanged and the particular features of the relevant 
industry.65 Courts view the exchange of price information as particularly 
suspicious.66 Some information sharing, like collaboration on research 
and development, or use of an unbiased organization to set industry 
standards, is typically permitted.67 
B. Original Intent of the Sherman Act 
Courts frequently inquire into Congress’s intent to determine the 
correct application of a statute, especially when a statute is ambiguous on 
its face.68 The brevity of the Sherman Act has increased the focus of both 
scholars and courts on the original intent of the Act, including whether 
social and moral factors have relevance in Sherman Act analysis.69 
Debate surrounding the original intent of the Sherman Act spans far 
back into the law’s history.70 Indeed, some scholars and courts originally 
opined that the Sherman Act had social and political aims.71 But economic 
theory shifted in the late 1950s and 1960s to reflect what is now known 
as the “Chicago School of Economics.”72 In the view of the Chicago 
School, markets self-regulate, consumers are rational beings, and 
government intervention impedes economic progress.73 One notable 
Chicago School antitrust scholar, Robert Bork, authored a groundbreaking 
article in 1966 arguing that the Sherman Act’s legislative history clearly 
reflected the law’s original intent: “the maximization of wealth or 
consumer want satisfaction.”74 
The Bork and Chicago School model became the majority view of both 
 
65. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978). 
66. Id. 
67. Inara Scott, Antitrust and Socially Responsible Collaboration: A Chilling Combination?, 53 
AM. BUS. L.J. 97, 97–98, 98 n.4 (2016). 
68. Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 605 (1996). 
69. See generally Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & 
ECON. 7 (1966); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Bork’s “Legislative Intent” and the Courts, 79 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 941 (2014).  
70. Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 942. 
71. See id. 
72. Daniel Yergin & Joseph Stanislaw, The Chicago School, in COMMANDING HEIGHTS 145, 145–
49 (1998), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/ess_chicagoschool.html 
[https://perma.cc/S3Z7-6GX9]. 
73. Id. 
74. Bork, supra note 69, at 7. Some scholars even argue that Bork’s article changed the opinion of 
the Court, as it was cited in court opinions and the analysis was quickly adopted by courts. See 
Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 944–45. 
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courts and scholars, and has held steady over a number of decades.75 In 
fact, some courts and scholars have gone to great lengths to emphasize 
that the original intent of the Sherman Act did not encompass anything 
beyond consumer welfare.76 Bork repeatedly emphasized this, explaining 
that “[t]he legislative history . . . contains no colorable support for 
application by courts of any value premise or policy other than the 
maximization of consumer welfare.”77 Though “consumer welfare” could 
plausibly be interpreted broadly as encompassing more than just 
economic well-being, scholars like Bork argue that the legislative history 
shows that the “meaning was unmistakable.”78 These scholars argue that 
courts were not expected or meant to consider non-economic factors, but 
instead, under the rule of reason, were confined to weighing the economic 
consequences of agreements.79 
In contrast to the majority view, some scholars have argued that the 
Sherman Act’s congressional history reflects populist ideals and Congress 
was not solely focused on consumer want satisfaction.80 Specifically, 
some scholars and judges have argued that the intent of the Sherman Act 
went beyond the maximization of wealth and courts were meant to 
consider social and political factors.81 These scholars, however, are in 
the minority.82 
C. Exemptions to Sherman Act Section 1 
Congress has the ability to grant exemptions to antitrust law and has 
done so in the past.83 The American Bar Association’s Antitrust Section 
has urged a four-part test by which to judge whether a congressional 
 
75. Ginsburg, supra note 69, at 943–47. 
76. Bork, supra note 69, at 10. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at 10–11. 
80. See generally Christopher Grandy, Original Intent and the Sherman Antitrust Act: A Re-
examination of the Consumer-Welfare Hypothesis, 53 J. ECON. HIST. 359 (1993). 
81. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Cont’l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1019 (9th Cir. 1976) (Browning, 
J., dissenting), aff’d, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (“The congressional debates reflect a concern not only with 
the consumer interest in price, quality, and quantity of goods and services, but also with society’s 
interest in the protection of the independent businessman, for reasons of social and political as well 
as economic policy.”). 
82. See Grandy, supra note 80, at 359 (“[T]he ‘Chicago School’ of antitrust has carried the day in 
both academic and public policy circles, and the conventional wisdom has incorporated Bork’s view 
of the Sherman Act.”). 
83. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (laying out an exemption for labor organizations). For a more 
comprehensive guide on antitrust exemptions and the kinds of exemptions that exist, see generally 
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1277–1560. 
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exemption is appropriate.84 According to the ABA, congressional 
exemptions should only be granted (1) in rare circumstances after 
“rigorous consideration of the impact of the proposed exemption or 
immunity on consumer welfare,” (2) when drafted in the narrowest 
possible way such that “competition is reduced only to the minimum 
extent necessary to achieve the intended goal,” (3) the goals of the 
exemption outweigh the goals of antitrust laws, and (4) the drafted 
exemption has a sunset provision.85 This test is not binding, but it 
spotlights the types of things Congress may consider when determining 
whether to grant an exemption. 
Antitrust exemptions granted by Congress exist in a broad range of 
industries and frequently reflect an attempt to further national policy 
interests.86 Some of these exemptions are unsurprising.87 Others are more 
unusual and heavily debated.88 Labor unions represent one prominent 
example.89 Namely, labor unions have the power to reach agreements on 
behalf of their members “[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and 
does not combine with non-labor groups.”90 Two other notable 
exemptions are rooted in two amendments to the U.S. Constitution—the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the state action doctrine. 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine91 clarifies that lobbying is protected by 
the First Amendment and therefore it cannot be considered a violation of 
antitrust law.92 In Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc.,93 a group of truck operators sued a group of railroads, 
arguing that their hiring of a public relations firm to “conduct a publicity 
campaign against the truckers” violated the Sherman Act.94 The publicity 
campaign was allegedly aimed at convincing government officials to pass 
 
84. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. ANTITRUST DIV., ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION SERIES ON COMPETITION & 
DEREGULATION 7 (2018) [hereinafter DOJ ROUNDTABLE], https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/ 
file/1120641/download [https://perma.cc/3NBC-E2ZL]. 
85. Id. A sunset provision or law is one that “automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period 
unless it is formally renewed.” Sunset Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1737 (11th ed. 2019). 
86. See, e.g., DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1317 (“Concern about the economic well-being of 
U.S. farmers and ranchers has been a factor in passage of the nation’s major antitrust legislation.”). 
87. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 17 (antitrust exemption for labor organizations). 
88. See, e.g., id. § 1291 (antitrust exemption for televising NFL games). 
89. See id. § 17; DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1491–99. 
90. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 232 (1941). 
91. The Noerr-Pennington exemption is named after a pair of cases that established the doctrine: 
Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and 
United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
92. See E. R.R. Presidents Conf., 365 U.S. at 136; United Mine Workers of Am., 381 U.S. at 670. 
93. 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
94. Id. at 129. 
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and veto legislation in ways that would be beneficial to the railroads and 
harmful to the truckers.95 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
railroads, holding that “the Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more 
persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature 
or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would 
produce a restraint or a monopoly.”96 However, the Court recognized that 
instances could arise where an effort to influence legislation “is a mere 
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.”97 If the lobbying 
is a “mere sham,” the Sherman Act can be applied appropriately.98 
In United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,99 small coal mine 
operators filed a claim against large coal operators and their union, 
arguing that the large operators and the union conspired to exclude the 
smaller, non-union operators from the market.100 The large coal mine 
operators’ union successfully petitioned the Secretary of Labor to amend 
federal law to establish “a minimum wage for employees of contractors 
selling coal to” the Tennessee Valley Authority101—a federally owned 
power company.102 The small coal mine operators argued that the change 
in law would have anticompetitive results because it would directly raise 
operating costs for all coal mine operators, including the small, non-union 
operators.103 Ultimately, those increased operating costs could drive the 
smaller operators out of business.104 The lower courts ruled in favor of the 
small operators, but the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding 
that the lower courts did not properly consider the holding in Noerr.105 
The Court made clear again that “[j]oint efforts to influence public 
officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to 
eliminate competition.”106 
However, in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Supreme Court made 
clear that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine does not apply to all lobbying 
 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 136. 
97. Id. at 144. 
98. Id. 
99. 381 U.S. 657 (1965). 
100. Id. at 659–60. 
101. Id. at 660. 
102. See 16 U.S.C. § 831. 
103. United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 664. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 669–70. 
106. Id. at 670. 
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efforts.107 In this case, a group of court-appointed attorneys108 conspired 
to refuse to represent indigent criminal defendants until the District of 
Columbia raised their compensation.109 While upholding its decisions in 
Noerr and its progeny, the Court distinguished the boycott in Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers, stating: “[I]n the Noerr case the alleged restraint of 
trade was the intended consequence of public action; in this case the 
boycott was the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable 
legislation.”110 Specifically, in Noerr, the truckers argued that the result 
of the railroads’ lobbying—a near monopoly in transportation of goods—
would be an unlawful restraint of trade.111 The Court disagreed because 
the lobbying was protected, regardless of whether it resulted in a restraint 
of trade.112 In contrast, the FTC argued in Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
that the initial agreement between the attorneys to boycott for higher 
wages was an unlawful restraint of trade.113 The Court agreed with the 
FTC that the group boycott was an unlawful agreement that directly 
resulted in higher prices, rather than a lawful lobbying attempt.114 
Another constitutional exemption is known as the state action 
immunity doctrine or Parker immunity.115 Under the state action 
immunity doctrine, states have immunity for “anticompetitive 
conduct . . . when acting in their sovereign capacity.”116 Non-state actors 
can find protection under the state action exemption if they are “carrying 
out the State’s regulatory program.”117 A private party must meet two 
requirements to invoke state action immunity: (1) the restraint must be 
“clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy,” and 
(2) the state must actively supervise the policy.118 
 
107. See FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (“Respondents’ 
agreement is not outside the coverage of the Sherman Act simply because its objective was the 
enactment of favorable legislation.”). 
108. These attorneys were not public defenders, but instead were attorneys in private practice who 
were appointed by the court to represent less serious cases under the District of Columbia’s Criminal 
Justice Act. Id. at 414–15. Pursuant to the Act, the attorneys were compensated $30 per hour for in-
court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time. Id. at 415. Through the boycott, the attorneys were 
asking for $55 per hour for in-court time and $45 per hour for out-of-court time. Id. at 415–16. 
109. Id. at 415–16. 
110. Id. at 424–25 (emphasis in original). 
111. E. R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 129 (1961). 
112. Id. at 136. 
113. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 418. 
114. Id. at 425. 
115. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 25, at 1277. 
116. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 574 U.S. 494, 503 (2015). 
117. FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 225 (2013). 
118. Id. (quoting Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 
(1980)). 
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The Supreme Court first laid out the state action immunity doctrine in 
Parker v. Brown.119 In Parker, the Court upheld a program in California 
that regulated the amount of raisins each supplier could sell and the price 
at which they could sell the raisins.120 The program stemmed from the 
California Agricultural Prorate Act.121 The explicit purpose of the Act was 
to decrease competition among growers in order to stabilize commodity 
prices.122 In this case, the Court was unwavering in the Sherman Act’s 
inapplicability to states: “The Sherman Act makes no mention of 
[states] . . . and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain state action 
or official action directed by a state.”123 
While the Noerr-Pennington and state action immunity doctrines are 
broad exemptions, exemptions to antitrust law can be narrow and 
industry-specific.124 Though some advocates and litigants have tried to 
establish exemptions to the antitrust laws for moral or social 
considerations, those efforts have repeatedly failed.125 The legislature has 
not granted an exemption for moral considerations, and most courts are 
hesitant to stray from a long line of precedent and the broad language of 
the Sherman Act.126 
II. ATTEMPTS TO ESTABLISH EXEMPTIONS FOR MORAL 
CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT 
Courts and antitrust scholars widely agree that the central purpose of 
antitrust law is to protect competition.127 Most antitrust scholars thus 
argue that there is no room in antitrust legal analysis to consider moral, 
ethical, or social justifications for violations of the Sherman Act.128 
 
119. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
120. Id. at 347–48. 
121. Id. at 346. This Act authorized the creation of a nine-person, state-run committee and gave 
that committee the authority to review and grant petitions for prorate programs for 
agricultural products. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 351. 
124. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (laying out antitrust exemption for telecasting sports games). 
125. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 419 (1990) (refusing to accept 
respondents’ social justification for an anticompetitive agreement). 
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (“Every contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . is 
declared to be illegal.” (emphasis added)). 
127. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962) (“Taken as a whole, the 
legislative history illuminates congressional concern with the protection of competition, not 
competitors . . . .” (emphasis omitted)). 
128. See, e.g., Lee Goldman, The Politically Correct Corporation and the Antitrust Laws: The 
Proper Treatment of Noneconomic or Social Welfare Justifications Under Section 1 of the Sherman 
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Though litigants have repeatedly attempted to establish an antitrust 
exemption for agreements involving moral or social considerations, courts 
have rejected those attempts.129 
A. The Scholarly Debate Regarding Moral Considerations in 
Antitrust Law 
Antitrust scholars have long considered non-economic policy goals to 
be outside of the purview of the Sherman Act’s rule of reason analysis.130 
Many antitrust scholars argue that considering non-economic policy goals 
would not only be outside of Congress’s intent in drafting the Sherman 
Act, but it would also work directly against the Act’s effectiveness.131 In 
their famed treatise on antitrust law, Phillip Areeda and Herbert 
Hovenkamp argue that considering things like the importance of small 
businesses or income inequality in antitrust law would lead to limitless 
antitrust challenges to innovative practices and would therefore be 
contrary to the primary purpose of antitrust law.132 
Areeda and Hovenkamp also discuss another problem with introducing 
non-economic policy concerns into antitrust law—differing interest 
groups.133 The two argue that it would not be possible to factor in non-
economic policy concerns due to the differing goals and opinions of 
various interest groups. For example, some groups may prefer big 
businesses, while others may prefer small businesses.134 This would 
admittedly complicate antitrust law, which works under the assumption 
that all consumers want the same things: higher quality, lower prices, and 
increased innovation.135 
Despite the frequency with which litigants raise non-economic factors 
 
Act, 13 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 137, 171–72 (1995) (arguing that social justifications should be left 
out of antitrust law). 
129. See generally Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); Nat’l Soc’y 
of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411. 
130. See, e.g., Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 226 U.S. at 49 (The Sherman Act’s prohibitions cannot 
“be evaded by good motives. The law is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it permits, or 
forbids, and the judgment of the courts cannot be set up against it in a supposed accommodation of 
its policy with the good intention of the parties, and it may be, of some good results.”); Nat’l Soc’y of 
Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (“[T]he statutory policy [of the Sherman Act] precludes inquiry into the 
question whether competition is good or bad.”). 
131. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 104–05 (4th ed. 2013). 
132. See id. at 105 (“A policy more hostile toward innovation is hard to imagine . . . .”). 
133. See id. at 106–08. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. at 109. 
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in antitrust cases,136 few scholars have come out in support of a social or 
moral exemption to antitrust laws. However, some scholars have argued 
that antitrust analysis should include non-economic concerns that affect 
consumers.137 Professor Inara Scott argues that antitrust laws should be 
more flexible to allow for agreements that address important social issues, 
such as climate change.138 One of her specific suggestions calls for courts 
to look at the effect of agreements on the economy as a whole, rather than 
just on their specific market.139 
Alternatively, Neil Averitt and Robert Lande have led the push for a 
broader “consumer choice” method to antitrust analysis instead of the 
traditional “consumer welfare” method.140 Averitt and Lande argue that 
antitrust law should focus on increasing consumer choice rather than the 
more restrictive model that focuses primarily on decreasing price and 
increasing output.141 Much of the literature from Averitt and Lande 
focuses on section 2 of the Sherman Act, which is outside the scope of 
section 1, but it still provides a framework for including a broader range 
of factors in antitrust analysis.142 
B. International Approaches to Environmental Factors in 
Antitrust Law 
Unlike the United States, other countries allow environmental 
 
136. See generally Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912); Nat’l Soc’y 
of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 
411 (1990). 
137. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 67, at 142–44 (“Antitrust law has the flexibility to allow for certain 
types of socially responsible collaborations . . . .”). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. at 143. It is worth noting that this proposition would likely run in direct opposition to the 
Supreme Court precedent laid out in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 
(1963). In Philadelphia National Bank, the Supreme Court enjoined a merger of two banks, striking 
down the banks’ argument that although they would have a large market share in their local 
geographical area, the merger would make them more competitive in New York and that New York 
should thus be considered part of the “relevant market.” Id. at 360–62. The Court refused to expand 
the relevant market analysis, stating “[i]f anticompetitive effects in one market could be justified by 
procompetitive consequences in another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry 
could . . . embark on a series of mergers that would make it end as large as the industry leader.” Id. at 
370. Nevertheless, an antitrust exemption from Congress could change this precedent, at least in 
regard to sustainability agreements. 
140. Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the “Consumer Choice” Approach to Antitrust 
Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 175–76 (2007). 
141. Id. at 175. 
142. See generally id. at 175–76. 
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considerations to factor into competition analysis.143 For example, 
Australia takes non-economic factors into account in its antitrust analysis 
by using a public interest test.144 This test looks similar to the rule of 
reason analysis that courts use in the United States, except it allows courts 
to consider non-economic factors.145 Courts may weigh potential non-
economic detriments and benefits so long as those factors would have an 
effect on the community generally.146 Australian courts interpret these 
terms broadly: public benefits can include “anything of value to the 
community generally . . .” and public detriments can include “any 
impairment to the community generally.”147 Some antitrust scholars argue 
for a similar public interest test to replace current antitrust analysis in the 
United States.148 These scholars argue that antitrust law must take into 
account other, non-economic factors to provide the best and most 
complete protection for consumers.149 
South Africa also uses a “public interest” test in its antitrust analysis.150 
When analyzing a merger, courts factor in public interest considerations 
by examining the effect of the merger on: 
(a) a particular industrial sector or region; (b) employment; 
(c) the ability of small and medium businesses, or firms 
controlled or owned by historically disadvantaged persons, to 
effectively enter into, participate in or expand within the market; 
(d) the ability of national industries to compete in international 
markets; and (e) the promotion of a greater spread of ownership, 
in particular to increase the levels of ownership by historically 
 
143. Most other countries refer to antitrust law as “competition law.” See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton & 
Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and 
Their Effects, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 271, 277 (2007) (calling the Sherman Act a “competition law” and 
using the terms antitrust law and competition law interchangeably). These terms are largely 
interchangeable and refer to the same body of law. Id. 
144. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOP. & DEV., POLICY ROUNDTABLES: HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS IN 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT, 29–30 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/cartels/ 
49139867.pdf [https://perma.cc/46ZN-5KF4]. 
145. Id. 
146. See id. 
147. See id. at 30 (quoting Re 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, Austl. Ass’n of Convenience Stores Inc. & 
Queensland Newsagents Fed’n, (1994) ATPR 41,357, 42,677, 42,683 (Austl.)). 
148. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV. 551, 618 
(2012) (explaining that non-economic factors could be considered under the rule of reason). The 
movement for a public interest standard in U.S. competition law has garnered intense scrutiny by 
some antitrust scholars. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 714, 746 (2018) (“Trying to use antitrust to solve problems outside the sphere of competition 
will not work and could well backfire.”). 
149. See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 148, at 624 (“Any antitrust policy, which seeks to promote well-
being, must balance multiple political, social, moral, and economic objectives.”). 
150. Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 12A(3) (S. Afr.). 
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disadvantaged persons.151 
For example, in Walmart Stores Inc. v. Massmart Holdings Ltd.,152 a 
South African court considered a merger between Walmart and Massmart, 
a South African retailer.153 After determining that the merger did not pose 
any competition concerns because Walmart did not yet have a retail 
presence in South Africa, the court turned its focus to the public interest 
implications of the merger.154 The court had some concerns about certain 
public interest effects of the merger such as employment,155 collective 
bargaining,156 and the effect on local small businesses and suppliers.157 As 
a result, the two companies agreed to undertake certain actions as 
conditions of the merger such as creating jobs, allowing employees to join 
labor unions, and “support[ing] local suppliers and in particular small 
businesses and [Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act]158 
suppliers.”159 
The Netherlands is the first country in the European Union to consider 
implementing a special analysis for sustainability agreements under its 
competition law.160 The Dutch Authority for Competition and Markets 
(ACM) released the proposal—the Draft Guidelines on Sustainability 
 
151. Id. (emphasis omitted). While these factors are certainly important to moving society forward, 
they are largely outside the scope of this Comment. Further research could be focused on an 
exemption that could promote small businesses or businesses owned by marginalized groups. 
152. No. 73/LM/Dec10 (S. Afr. Competition Tribunal June 29, 2011).  
153. See id. at 1–2.  
154. See id. at 9–10 ¶¶ 26–30. 
155. Id. at 13–20 ¶¶ 39–58. 
156. Id. at 20–25 ¶¶ 59–71. 
157. Id. at 26–38 ¶¶ 72–121. 
158. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act was passed to address some of the 
hardships suffered by Black South Africans during apartheid. See Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.). The Act is aimed at increasing the “participation of [B]lack 
people in the economy.” Id. For more information on the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, see generally Andrea Sekai M’Paradzi, BEE – Basis, Evolution, Evaluation: A 
Critical Appraisal of Black Economic Empowerment in South Africa (2014) (dissertation for 
Postgraduate Diploma in commercial law, University of Cape Town), 
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/4516/thesis_law_mprand001.pdf;jsessionid=598F0C1
A04C67CE53C5B9A774DFFB879?sequence=1 [https://perma.cc/4XQ7-XG5Y]. 
159. WalMart Stores Inc., No. 73/LM/Dec10, at 39 ¶ 122 (quoting SACCAWU core bundle for 
cross examination file record page 2503). 
160. HOGAN LOVELLS, COMPETITION LAW AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH: THE DUTCH 
COMPETITION AUTHORITY CONSULTS ON GUIDELINES THAT PAVE THE WAY FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY 
IN THE FIELD 1 (July 21, 2020) [hereinafter COMPETITION LAW AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH], 
https://www.hoganlovells.com/~/media/hogan-lovells/pdf/2020-pdfs/2020_07_21_competition-law-
and-sustainable-growth.pdf [https://perma.cc/7U4F-PPXW]. 
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Agreements—in July 2020.161 The ACM presented two types of 
sustainability agreements that may withstand antitrust scrutiny based on 
the new guidelines.162 The first involves agreements that do not have 
anticompetitive effects and therefore fall outside of antitrust law.163 The 
second involves agreements where sustainability benefits outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects.164 To fall into the second category, an agreement 
must meet four criteria: (1) the agreement must have sustainability 
benefits, (2) the ultimate consumer must receive “a fair share of those 
benefits,” (3) the restraint on competition is not greater than necessary to 
achieve those benefits, and (4) the agreement does not eliminate “a 
substantial part of the products in question.”165 
The Dutch Guidelines take a broad approach in two main ways.166 First, 
they do not require quantitative evidence of sustainability benefits if the 
companies involved in the agreement enjoy less than 30% combined 
market share.167 Second, they take into account the future benefits of the 
sustainability agreements for future consumers, rather than just the current 
benefits for current consumers.168 This means that courts could consider 
benefits to the environment as a whole, rather than only considering 
benefits to the current consumer.169 
Though the ACM is the first competition authority in the European 
Union to propose such an exception for sustainability agreements, the 
European Commission has expressed its support of the Dutch Guidelines 
and is even considering adding a sustainability exception to the 
Commission’s own competition rules in 2022.170 Taken together, these 
countries’ methods could help inform the United States on how to 
appropriately factor the effects of climate change into antitrust analysis. 
C. Specific Attempts to Establish Social Exemptions to the 
Sherman Act 
Litigants have repeatedly attempted to defeat Sherman Act claims by 
 
161. See generally Autoriteit Consument & Markt, Guidelines on Sustainability Agreements: 
Opportunities Within Competition Law (July 9, 2020), https://www.acm.nl/sites/default/files/ 
documents/2020-07/sustainability-agreements%5B1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT44-A2C5] (draft). 
162. Id. at 7, 10. 
163. Id. at 7. 
164. Id. at 10. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 11, 13. 
167. Id. at 13. 
168. Id. at 11. 
169. Id. 
170. COMPETITION LAW AND SUSTAINABLE GROWTH, supra note 160, at 1. 
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using justifications that traditionally fall outside the scope of antitrust 
law.171 Limiting antitrust analysis to economic factors stems back to 
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n,172 decided in 1897.173 In 
that case, Trans-Missouri Freight argued that their rate-setting agreement 
was procompetitive because the rates they had agreed upon were 
reasonable and that absent agreed-upon rates, the railroads may 
experience financial ruin.174 The Supreme Court refused to entertain that 
argument, holding explicitly that the concern that the railroads would fail 
was outside the purview of antitrust law.175 The Court also held that the 
reasonableness of the set rates was not an appropriate justification.176 
The precedent established in Trans-Missouri Freight has prospered 
over time.177 For example, in National Society of Professional Engineers 
v. United States, a group of engineers agreed to refuse to negotiate rates 
with customers until the customer selected a specific engineer.178 This 
agreement effectively eliminated the competitive process.179 The 
engineers claimed that this agreement was necessary to improve the 
quality of engineering in projects.180 The Court held that the engineers 
could not agree amongst themselves to eliminate competition, even if 
open competition would lead to undesirable results.181 The Court called 
the National Society of Professional Engineers’ argument “nothing less 
than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.”182 
Additionally, the Court emphasized that it did not matter that the 
engineers engaged in “projects significantly affecting the public safety,” 
adding that “[t]he judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public 
against . . . harm by conferring monopoly privileges 
 
171. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684–85 (1978) (denying 
National Society of Professional Engineers’ argument that the engineers’ agreement to end 
competitive bidding was justified because it would produce higher quality engineering projects). 
172. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). 
173. Id. at 338–39 (striking down argument that the rates agreed upon were reasonable). 
174. Id. at 310–11. 
175. Id. at 340–41 (“It may be that the policy evidenced by the passage of the act itself will, if 
carried out, result in disaster to the roads and in a failure to secure the advantages sought from such 
legislation. Whether that will be the result or not we do not know and cannot predict. These 
considerations are, however, not for us.”). 
176. Id. 
177. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) (emphasizing that 
the history of the Sherman Act makes clear that reasonableness of prices does not justify price-fixing).  
178. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 682–83 (1978). 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 684–85. 
181. Id. at 696 (“[W]e may assume that competition is not entirely conducive to ethical behavior, 
but that is not a reason, cognizable under the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition.”). 
182. Id. at 695. 
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on . . . manufacturers.”183 Lastly, the Court emphasized that it is the job of 
the legislature to regulate private industry.184 
The Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment about a decade later 
in Superior Court Trial Lawyers.185 In that case, lawyers participated in a 
boycott for higher rates of compensation because the District of Columbia 
was only paying the attorneys $20 per hour for out-of-court time and $30 
per hour for in-court time.186 The lawyers argued, in part, that the boycott 
was justified because it was in the public’s best interest to obtain better 
legal representation for indigent defendants.187 The Court ultimately held 
that this was not a recognizable defense under the Sherman Act, citing 
National Society of Professional Engineers.188 The Court again 
emphasized that “[t]he social justifications proffered for respondents’ 
restraint of trade . . . [did] not make it any less unlawful.”189 
In both of these cases, the Court clearly aligned itself with the Chicago 
School190 and justified not considering social factors because markets 
self-correct.191 In National Society of Professional Engineers, the Court 
implied that market forces would put bad engineers out of business.192 
Similarly, in Superior Court Trial Lawyers, the Court implied that market 
forces would help determine the appropriate rate at which to pay the 
boycotting attorneys.193 
In some instances, courts have appeared to consider non-economic 
factors, but those factors were always framed as economic in nature. For 
example, in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,194 
the NCAA restricted the number of college football games that CBS and 
ABC could televise for NCAA member schools.195 Although the NCAA 
still permitted CBS and ABC to negotiate with each school about the price 
and broadcasting of individual games,196 the parties could not agree to 
 
183. Id. at 695–96. 
184. Id. at 689–90. 
185. FTC v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1990). 
186. Id. at 415. 
187. Id. at 419. 
188. Id. at 423–24. 
189. Id. at 424. 
190. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
191. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978); Superior Ct. Trial 
Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 424. 
192. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695. 
193. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 424. 
194. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
195. Id. at 91–94. 
196. The NCAA did also set a minimum amount that CBS and ABC were required to pay to schools 
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televise more games than allowed by the NCAA.197 The NCAA also 
required the stations to feature a game from a minimum of eighty-two 
different member schools on their networks at least once during each 
two-year period.198 
The Supreme Court began its analysis of the NCAA’s plan by stating 
that “[h]orizontal price fixing and output limitation are ordinarily 
condemned as a matter of law under an ‘illegal per se’ approach.”199 The 
Court then went on to say, “[n]evertheless, we have decided . . . it would 
be inappropriate to apply a per se rule to this case . . . [because the] case 
involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are 
essential if the product is to be available at all.”200 In its analysis, the Court 
emphasized that without restraints on competition, the NCAA may cease 
to exist.201 
The Court initially stated that its decision was not based on its “respect 
for the NCAA’s historic role in the preservation and encouragement of 
intercollegiate amateur athletics” but then quickly changed its tune.202 
Specifically, the Court went on to say that the NCAA markets a “particular 
brand of football—college football.”203 That brand of football can only be 
preserved if athletes are unpaid and enrolled in school.204 Thus, in the view 
of the Court, “the integrity of the ‘product’ [could not] be preserved except 
by mutual agreement [because] if an institution adopted such restrictions 
unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might 
soon be destroyed.”205 Despite the Court’s insistence that its decision to 
apply a full rule of reason analysis was not focused on amateurism, it 
focused heavily on the topic throughout its explanation—explaining that 
without an agreement mandating amateurism, an organization like the 
NCAA could not exist.206 
The Supreme Court then proceeded to analyze the NCAA’s plan under 
 
for their allotted games, but the NCAA could negotiate pricing with each school separately. Id. at 
92–93. 
197. Id. at 90. 
198. Id. at 94. 
199. Id. at 100. 
200. Id. at 100–01. 
201. Id. at 101. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 102. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 117 (“It is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are 
justifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefore procompetitive 
because they enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics.”). 
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a rule of reason analysis.207 Ultimately, the Court found that the NCAA’s 
conduct violated the Sherman Act because its plan with the television 
stations was not narrowly tailored, nor was it necessary to preserve 
competition within the football leagues.208 Irrespective of its ultimate 
conclusion, the Court’s willingness to conduct a full-blown rule of reason 
analysis suggests that the Court viewed a largely non-economic factor—
amateurism—as a procompetitive justification. 
Although most courts have refused to explicitly consider moral or 
social justifications for anticompetitive conduct, one circuit court opinion 
stands out: United States v. Brown University.209 In Brown, the Third 
Circuit examined an agreement among Ivy League universities that only 
allowed the universities to award financial aid based on need and set the 
amount of financial aid given to commonly-admitted students.210 The 
court seemed to accept the school’s justification that the agreement 
increased access to education and diversity in education, even though 
these factors are largely non-economic in nature.211 In essence, the court 
in Brown framed increased access to education and diversity in education 
as economic because they improve the quality of the product and thereby 
enhance consumer choice.212 Some scholars have criticized the holding in 
Brown for failing to follow longstanding Supreme Court precedent 
established in cases like National Society of Professional Engineers and 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers.213 
Despite litigants’ repeated attempts and a few cases that seem to stray 
from the general rule, courts do not consider non-economic factors to be 
procompetitive justifications for the purpose of antitrust analysis.214 The 
belief that antitrust analysis should be limited to economic factors has held 
strong in over one hundred years of Sherman Act jurisprudence.215 
 
207. Id. at 103–20. 
208. Id. at 117–19. 
209. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). 
210. Id. at 674–75. 
211. Id. at 678. 
212. Id. 
213. See, e.g., Michael C. Petronio, Comment, Eliminating the Social Cost of Higher Education: 
The Third Circuit Allows Social Welfare Benefits to Justify Horizontal Restraints of Trade in United 
States v. Brown University, 83 GEO. L.J. 189, 215 (1994) (“By its ruling, the court has laid the 
groundwork for a serious deviation from well-accepted antitrust analysis.”). 
214. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (“[T]he statutory policy 
[of the Sherman Act] precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad.”). 
215. See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 338–39 (1897); FTC v. 
Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 423–24 (1990). 
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III. ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
Governmental bodies have been particularly slow and ineffective in 
responding to climate change. Some government leaders have refused to 
address environmental concerns completely, and a few have even pointed 
to the private sector as a better avenue for change.216 The private sector, 
on the other hand, has increasingly begun to realize its role in the climate 
crisis—sometimes even viewing sustainability as a profitable endeavor.217 
The automobile industry frames the issue well, emphasizing the impact 
private industry could have on the climate crisis if given more freedom to 
address the issue.218 
A. The Need for Private Contribution to Environmental Protection 
At its core, climate change refers to Earth’s rising average 
temperature.219 The ten hottest years on record all occurred between 1998 
and 2018, with nine out of ten occurring since 2005.220 The five hottest 
years on record occurred between 2014 and 2018.221 Scientists predict that 
these trends will continue at least through the next decade.222 They also 
estimate that humans have caused one degree Celsius of global warming 
from pre-industrial levels.223 That increase is expected to reach 
one-and-a-half degrees Celsius between 2030 and 2052.224 
Climate change is expected to affect every part of our lives in the 
coming years—and in many ways it already has.225 Climate change has 
caused rising sea levels, loss of various plant and animal species, 
increased ocean temperatures, heat-related illness and death, reduced food 
 
216. David Gelles & Somini Sengupta, Big Business Says It Will Tackle Climate Change, but Not 
How or When, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/business/corporate-
climate-davos.html [https://perma.cc/WJW8-JE28]. 
217. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 17 (explaining that sustainable investing will be profitable for 
BlackRock’s clients). 
218. See Oliver Milman, Vehicles Are Now America’s Biggest CO2 Source but EPA Is Tearing Up 
Regulations, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 1, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/01 
/vehicles-climate-change-emissions-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/82W4-9J59]. 
219. What Is Climate Change? A Really Simple Guide, BBC NEWS (May 5, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-24021772 [https://perma.cc/96DV-9FVE]. 
220. Anthony Arguez, Shannan Hurley, Anand Inamdar, Laurel Mahoney, Ahira Sanchez-Lugo & 
Lilian Yang, Should We Expect Each Year in the Next Decade (2019–28) to Be Ranked Among the 
Top 10 Warmest Years Globally?, 101 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y E655, E656 tbl.1 (2020). 
221. Id. 
222. Id. at E661. 
223. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 4 
(Valerie Masson-Delmotte et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter GLOBAL WARMING]. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. at 7–10. 
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availability, reduced levels of drinking water, abnormal weather patterns, 
increased natural disaster risk, and many other problems.226 Scientists 
again predict these trends will continue well into the future.227 Moreover, 
climate change disproportionately affects minority groups and 
impoverished communities.228 
Slowing climate change remains vital to our survival as a species.229 
Some climate experts have argued that civilization could start to collapse 
by 2050 if humans do not take immediate action to slow global 
warming.230 Two degrees Celsius of global warming poses significantly 
greater risks than one-and-a-half degrees Celsius.231 Though some 
disagreement exists about exactly how much time we have to change the 
trajectory of global warming or whether we have already reached the 
tipping point,232 it is clear that we must take immediate action for any 
chance of survival.233 
Despite increased focus on climate change globally, greenhouse gas 
emissions rose in the United States in 2018 by 2.7%.234 Some global 
leaders have shown an unwillingness to address the problem of climate 




228. Id. at 9. For a more in-depth look on how climate change disproportionately impacts poor and 
minority communities, see generally S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social 
Inequality (U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affs., Working Paper, Paper No. 152, 2017), 
https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2017/wp152_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLA5-YT8E]. 
229. See GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 223, at 7–10. 
230. DAVID SPRATT & IAN DUNLOP, BREAKTHROUGH NAT’L CTR. FOR CLIMATE RESTORATION, 
EXISTENTIAL CLIMATE-RELATED SECURITY RISK: A SCENARIO APPROACH 8–9 (2019), 
https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_a1406e0143ac4c469196d3003bc1e687.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4MGB-DQRJ]. 
231. See GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 223, at 7–10. 
232. Fred Pearce, As Climate Change Worsens, a Cascade of Tipping Points Looms, YALE ENV’T 
360 (Dec. 5, 2019), https://e360.yale.edu/features/as-climate-changes-worsens-a-cascade-of-tipping-
points-looms [https://perma.cc/BZ3A-F5ZD] (“Some tipping points . . . may already have been 
breached at the current 1 degree C of warming.”). 
233. Id. 
234. Perry Lindstrom, U.S. Energy-Related CO2 Emissions Rose in 2018 for the First Year Since 
2014, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.: TODAY IN ENERGY (Nov. 26, 2019), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42115 [https://perma.cc/FCR2-8S5Q]. 
235. See, e.g., Carolyn Kormann, When Will Australia’s Prime Minister Accept the Reality of the 
Climate Crisis?, NEW YORKER (Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/when-
will-australias-prime-minister-accept-the-reality-of-the-climate-crisis [https://perma.cc/BME7-
LLCN] (describing Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s allegiance to the fossil fuel industry); 
Juliet Eilperin, Josh Dawsey & Brady Dennis, White House Update of Key Environmental Law Would 
Exclude Climate Change, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2020, 5:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
climate-environment/white-house-update-of-key-environmental-law-would-exclude-climate-
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leaders thus far have done little to address the issue.236 
The Paris Agreement is a prime example of a government-led climate 
change initiative that is unlikely to achieve its desired climate goals.237 
The agreement involved 196 parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change who contracted in December 2015 to 
implement changes that would limit the global temperature rise to less 
than two degrees Celsius.238 The agreement requires each member country 
to comply with “nationally determined contributions,” which are 
effectively individual emission-reduction plans.239 Although the United 
States is one of the largest emitters of CO2,240 the Trump Administration 
chose to withdraw from the Paris Agreement.241 This renders the 
agreement much less valuable than it would be with 
American participation.242 
Domestic efforts to curb climate change have fallen flat as well,243 and 
those that have seen success have not gone far enough to address the 
severity of the climate crisis.244 Some states have taken steps on their own 
 
change/2020/01/03/35491e10-2e89-11ea-9b60-817cc18cf173_story.html [https://perma.cc/3RA4-
ZRB9] (explaining President Donald Trump’s rollback of Obama-era climate change initiatives). 
236. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2019: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2019) 
[hereinafter EMISSIONS GAP REPORT], https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500. 
11822/30798/EGR19ESEN.pdf?sequence=13 [https://perma.cc/5S45-EHG7]. 
237. What Is the Paris Agreement?, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/what-is-the-paris-agreement (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2020). 
238. Id. 
239. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-paris-agreement 
/nationally-determined-contributions-ndcs (last visited Oct. 19, 2020). 
240. Emissions Data, supra note 5. 
241. Rebecca Hersher, U.S. Formally Begins to Leave the Paris Climate Agreement, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Nov. 4, 2019, 3:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/04/773474657/u-s-formally-begins-
to-leave-the-paris-climate-agreement [https://perma.cc/8AKF-TFVR]. 
242. Id. The United States, along with other wealthy countries, also pledged to help developing 
countries meet their emissions goals. Id. The loss of the United States from the Paris Agreement thus 
extends further than our own borders. 
243. Compare Press Release, The White House Off. of the Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: President 
Obama to Announce Historic Carbon Pollution Standards for Power Plants (Aug. 3, 2015), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/08/03/fact-sheet-president-obama-
announce-historic-carbon-pollution-standards [https://perma.cc/9R4P-RZ5V] (describing the Obama 
administration’s Clean Power Plan which set standards to for carbon emissions from power plants), 
with Press Release, The Env’t Prot. Agency Press Off., EPA Finalizes Affordable Clean Energy Rule, 
Ensuring Reliable, Diversified Energy Resources by Protecting our Environment (June 19, 2019), 
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-finalizes-affordable-clean-energy-rule-ensuring-reliable-
diversified-energy [https://perma.cc/2SRL-38D2] (describing the Trump administration’s Affordable 
Clean Energy Rule which replaced the Clean Power Plan, set guidelines for reducing carbon 
emissions rather than requirements, and left specific action up to the states). 
244. See EMISSIONS GAP REPORT, supra note 236, at 4. 
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to enact policies to curb emissions,245 but the efforts of state governments 
are necessarily limited in scope. Moreover, fewer than half of states have 
taken the initiative to enact these kinds of policies aimed at curbing 
CO2 emissions.246 
Although climate change has become a global concern with potentially 
catastrophic consequences, governments have been slow to respond to the 
impending effects of climate change. Government efforts on the global, 
national, and state levels have thus far been ineffective at curbing the rise 
in global temperatures. 
B. Response of Private Actors to Environmental Concerns 
In contrast to governments, companies have increasingly recognized 
their role in the climate crisis.247 Some companies have started to look at 
becoming more environmentally friendly and enacting sustainability 
practices, recognizing that these initiatives could lead to long-term 
profitability.248 Shareholders and employees also put pressure on 
corporations to address the climate crisis.249 Further, many corporations 
operate on a global scale and a company policy to reduce emissions could 
thus have an impact beyond the borders of a single country. 
At the annual World Economic Forum in January 2020, 140 business 
leaders vowed “to develop a core set of common metrics to track 
environmental and social responsibility.”250 The same week, Steven 
Mnuchin, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, downplayed the severity of the 
crisis, stating bluntly: “We don’t believe there should be carbon 
taxes . . . [w]e think that industry can deal with this issue on its own.”251 
 
245. See, e.g., Chandler Green, 7 Ways U.S. States Are Leading Climate Action, U.N. FOUND. (May 
30, 2019), https://unfoundation.org/blog/post/7-ways-u-s-states-are-leading-climate-action/ 
[https://perma.cc/8Z76-992M] (explaining how states are taking action on climate change, such as 
setting higher emissions standards and creating financing opportunities for clean-energy projects). 
246. State Climate Policy Maps, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLS., 
https://www.c2es.org/content/state-climate-policy/ [https://perma.cc/N5NE-GH2D]. 
247. See, e.g., Lucas, supra note 19 (discussing Starbucks’s new sustainability initiatives and its 
goal to become “resource positive” by 2030); Sorkin, supra note 20 (explaining that BlackRock 
investments announced it will “make investment decisions with environmental sustainability as a 
core goal”). 
248. See, e.g., Fink, supra note 17 (“[W]e believe that sustainable investing is the strongest 
foundation for client portfolios going forward.”). 
249. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, Thousands of Amazon Employees Ask the Company to Adopt a Climate 
Change Plan, THE VERGE (Apr. 10, 2019, 1:22 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/4/10/ 
18304800/amazon-employees-open-letter-climate-change-plan [https://perma.cc/P995-3NQ2] 
(discussing an open letter from Amazon employees asking the company to take action on 
climate change). 
250. Gelles & Sengupta, supra note 216. 
251. Id. 
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This contrast provides a glaring example of the different outlooks held by 
governments and corporations, and demonstrates that even U.S. 
leadership plans to rely on industry to solve the problem. 
Juxtaposed with Mnuchin’s statements, in that same month the CEO of 
BlackRock Investments, Larry Fink, released his annual letter to CEOs 
emphasizing the company’s plan to address climate change.252 In the 
letter, Fink stated that “[c]limate change has become a defining factor in 
companies’ long-term prospects.”253 He also notably emphasized that 
BlackRock will be “making sustainability integral to portfolio 
construction and risk management; exiting investments that present a high 
sustainability-related risk.”254 BlackRock’s letter informed companies it 
invests in that they must provide BlackRock with disclosure reports 
regarding sustainability and climate-related risks.255 He further stated that 
BlackRock “will be increasingly disposed to vote against management 
and board directors when companies are not making sufficient progress 
on sustainability-related disclosures and the business practices and plans 
underlying them.”256 Given that BlackRock manages nearly $7 trillion in 
investments,257 the letter is sure to make waves. And in some ways, it 
already has. Shortly after Fink released his letter, large companies like 
Microsoft,258 Delta Airlines,259 and Starbucks260 all made new pledges 
involving climate change. While these entities can afford to take large and 
costly steps to address their contribution to climate change, smaller 
companies may not have that option if forced to act unilaterally. In other 
words, in order for smaller companies to make progress reducing their 
carbon footprint, they may need to pool their resources with other firms 
or, at the very least, have assurance that other firms will take similar 
costly steps. 
 





257. Sorkin, supra note 20. 
258. Camila Domonoske, Microsoft Pledges to Remove from the Atmosphere All the Carbon It Has 
Ever Emitted, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 16, 2020, 2:25 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/ 
01/16/796758230/microsoft-pledges-to-remove-from-the-atmosphere-all-the-carbon-its-ever-
emitted [https://perma.cc/HH64-5M85]. 
259. Tracy Rucinski, Delta to Invest $1 Billion to Curb Global Air Travel’s Climate Impact, 
REUTERS (Feb. 14, 2020, 5:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-climate-change-delta-
air/delta-to-invest-1-billion-to-curb-global-air-travels-climate-impact-idUSKBN2081FY 
[https://perma.cc/BQV8-7D2L]. 
260. Lucas, supra note 19. 
Koga (Do Not Delete) 12/16/2020  10:34 PM 
2020] CHANGING ANTITRUST LAW 2017 
 
C. Scholarly Views on Considering Environmental Policy in 
Antitrust Law 
The general view among antitrust scholars is that antitrust law is not 
the proper channel to address regulatory concerns such as environmental 
policy.261 Enforcement agencies have viewed agreements involving 
climate change in the same way as those involving other ethical and social 
considerations, stressing that the social benefits of the agreements cannot 
be taken into account as procompetitive justifications.262 Further, antitrust 
jurisprudence emphasizes that legislative bodies are better suited to 
address ethical and moral considerations—not the courts.263 The DOJ and 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) may be similarly unfit to determine 
such matters through non-enforcement decisions.264 The Supreme Court 
has said itself that “we may assume that competition is not entirely 
conducive to ethical behavior, but that is not a reason, cognizable under 
the Sherman Act, for doing away with competition.”265 
Other scholars argue that antitrust laws can hinder potential solutions 
to environmental problems.266 For example, Jonathan Adler argues that 
many environmental problems can be seen as tragedies of the commons—
where every person behaves in a self-interested manner that ultimately 
creates a detriment to broader society.267 A tragedy of the commons exists 
when individuals’ interests are contrary to the community’s interests.268 
In the fishing context, for example, each individual person would benefit 
from catching as many fish as possible, but broader society would benefit 
from limiting each person’s fishing to protect the fish population. Adler 
explains that restraints on fishing can solve the tragedy of the commons 
 
261. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 131, at 104–05. 
262. Delrahim, supra note 15. 
263. See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689–90 (1978) (stating 
that arguments by litigants to create exemptions to antitrust law for certain industries should be made 
to Congress, not the courts); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221–22 (1940) 
(“Congress has not left with us the determination of whether or not particular price-fixing schemes 
are wise or unwise, healthy or destructive. . . . If such a shift is to be made, it must be done by 
the Congress.”). 
264. See, e.g., Delrahim, supra note 15 (stating that the DOJ Antitrust Division cannot “refrain 
from examining possible anti-competitive conduct because it would be politically unpopular”). 
265. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 696. 
266. See, e.g., Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71 STAN. L. 
REV. 137, 176–80 (2019) (explaining that while at times antitrust law can mandate 
environmentally-friendly behavior, it can also prohibit and disincentivize environmentally-friendly 
behavior). 
267. Jonathan H. Adler, Conservation Through Collusion: Antitrust as an Obstacle to Marine 
Resource Conservation, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 9–10 (2004). 
268. See id. at 9. 
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problem of overfishing.269 Antitrust disallows the creation of some of 
these community-oriented restraints. Antitrust laws may therefore 
exacerbate these types of environmental problems.270 
D. The Auto Industry as a Case Study 
Despite the environmental threat posed by lower emissions standards, 
the DOJ opened an antitrust investigation into four automakers who came 
to an agreement with California to heighten vehicle emissions 
standards.271 This agreement was in response to the low emissions 
standards set by the Trump administration—a stark reversal of those set 
by the Obama administration.272 The car manufacturers and California 
stated that an agreement on emissions standards was necessary due to the 
nature of the car industry.273 Namely, they argued that the automakers 
need the ability to predict future emissions standards to develop 
appropriate technology and begin to manufacture new vehicles.274 The 
agreement was therefore touted as one that would provide certainty and 
stability to industry professionals on top of improving 
automobile emissions.275 
The Justice Department was, at least initially, unwilling to accept that 
argument.276 Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim made multiple 
statements, citing cases such as National Society of Professional 
Engineers and Superior Trial Court Lawyers to support his argument that 
antitrust has never allowed moral considerations to factor into its analyses 
of potentially anticompetitive agreements.277 Throughout the DOJ’s 
investigation, it remained unclear what their legal argument could rest on. 
If the automakers had agreed with California to increase emissions 
standards, state action immunity would likely protect the agreement, 
 
269. See id. at 24–25. 
270. Id. at 25. There is a federal antitrust exemption for fishing cooperatives: The Fisherman’s 
Collective Marketing Act (FCMA), 15 U.S.C. § 521. Adler argues that the exemption is too narrow, 
in part because members of cooperatives must “deal primarily in the products of its members.” Adler, 
supra note 267, at 39. He provides an example of a catfish processer, Delta Pride Catfish, Inc., that 
was denied protection under the exemption because it was in agreement with two larger firms that 
were “more fully integrated” and thus not “farmers” within the definition of the Act. Id. at 40. 
271. Tabuchi & Davenport, supra note 6. 
272. Id. 
273. Davenport & Tabuchi, supra note 1. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Delrahim, supra note 15. 
277. Id. (“[T]he Supreme Court has struck down collective efforts by engineers to enhance ‘public 
safety’ as well as a collective effort by criminal defense lawyers with the goal of improving quality 
of representation for ‘indigent criminal defendants.’”). 
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assuming there was ongoing state supervision.278 Alternatively, if the 
automakers agreed with each other to petition California for higher 
emissions standards and California complied, the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine would likely protect the agreement.279 
At the time, no evidence seemed to exist that the automakers had agreed 
amongst themselves at all. In fact, California repeatedly emphasized that 
each company entered into a separate agreement with the state—not with 
one another.280 Thus, many believed the investigation was improper 
because no agreement between the automakers ever occurred.281 The DOJ 
dropped the investigation five months later.282 
Four months after the DOJ dropped the investigation, a whistleblower 
from the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division testified in front of the 
House Judiciary Committee to notify the committee of his concerns over 
some recent antitrust investigations conducted by the DOJ, including the 
automaker investigation.283 The whistleblower, John Elias, expressed his 
concern that the DOJ had opened the investigation in response to a series 
of tweets by President Trump284 without considering the viability of the 
claim—in contravention of typical DOJ practice.285 Indeed, the DOJ 
opened the investigation on August 22, 2019—one day after Trump’s 
tweets criticizing the automakers’ agreement with California.286 In 
 
278. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Are Regulatory Agreements to Address Climate Change 
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response to the whistleblower’s testimony, Assistant Attorney General 
Delrahim wrote a letter explaining that (1) the investigation was proper 
and narrowly tailored, (2) the timing of Trump’s tweet was purely 
coincidental, and (3) political appointees are fully capable of running the 
Justice Department.287 He also made clear that the DOJ terminated the 
investigation because the department found that the automakers had never 
entered into an agreement.288 
The automakers in this case escaped prosecution, but the DOJ’s inquiry 
alone may have made the agreement less effective than it otherwise would 
have been. It was reported that at least one car manufacturer backed out 
of the agreement as a result of the agency’s scrutiny.289 Additionally, 
California had to go out of its way to emphasize that each company 
reached a separate agreement with the state.290 But despite the parties’ 
efforts to ensure the deal would not attract antitrust scrutiny, the DOJ 
persisted in its investigation.291 Based on these actions, it seems that the 
companies felt largely constrained by antitrust laws, struggled to get 
around them, and still ended up the target of a probe by the DOJ. 
The automobile industry is one industry that could be transformed if 
antitrust regulations were relaxed even slightly. Auto emissions were the 
largest contributor to greenhouse gas pollution in the United States in 
2017.292 This is true despite efforts by lawmakers and the EPA over the 
last half-century to curb auto emissions.293 Further, the frequent change in 
administration in the US means regulatory standards are constantly 
shifting. This makes it difficult for industries like the automobile industry 
to predict future needs and invest in environmentally 
friendly innovations.294 
In the case of the automakers in California, an antitrust exemption for 
agreements with positive environmental effects may have persuaded more 
than four automakers to join the agreement. But there is, of course, a 
downside to this type of agreement in the auto industry: higher emissions 
standards could reduce consumer choice and increase the cost of 
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purchasing a vehicle. This may leave some consumers unable to afford 
their preferred car. But given the existential threat of climate change, 
perhaps the long-term benefits outweigh these short-term costs. 
Our understanding of both economics and climate change continues to 
develop. The Chicago School vision of the rational person and 
self-correcting markets has started to give way to the study of behavioral 
economics.295 Even more importantly, climate change continues to 
worsen, and people generally agree that it poses an existential threat to 
our planet.296 Allowing for some cooperation among competitors could 
help address some of our climate change concerns. 
IV. SUSTAINABILITY AGREEMENTS WITH OR WITHOUT AN 
EXEMPTION 
Congress has the ability to codify exemptions to antitrust laws and has 
done so numerous times in the past.297 Congress should pass an exemption 
to antitrust law for sustainability agreements using the Dutch Guidelines 
as a model. This would allow companies to enter into agreements 
addressing climate change without fear of antitrust litigation. While this 
type of exemption may increase the risk of cartel behavior, keeping the 
exemption narrowly tailored and requiring quantitative evidence of 
sustainability benefits can mitigate those anticompetitive concerns. In the 
meantime, litigants should frame sustainability agreements in economic 
terms to survive antitrust scrutiny and can use past precedent as a model 
to do so. 
A. Congress Should Pass a Sustainability Exemption 
Congress should adopt an antitrust exemption for sustainability 
agreements similar to that proposed in the Netherlands.298 For agreements 
that have anticompetitive effects, Congress can require companies to meet 
the four main requirements suggested by the Dutch: (1) the agreement 
must have sustainability benefits, (2) the ultimate consumer must receive 
“a fair share of those benefits,” (3) the restraint on competition must not 
be greater than necessary to achieve those benefits, and (4) the agreement 
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must not eliminate “a substantial part of the products/services 
in question.”299 
While the broad proposal from the Netherlands represents the most 
ideal solution, Congress could change the exemption in two ways that 
would be more consistent with current precedent and also limit the risk of 
cartel behavior. First, the exception could require companies to always 
have quantitative data showing a certain threshold of environmental 
benefits, regardless of market share. Requiring quantitative data that 
shows benefits to a certain threshold could reduce arbitrary results. It 
could also help to partially ensure that the agreement is not a cover for a 
cartel in that the environmental impacts would have to be real, not just 
suggested or purported. 
Second, Congress could limit the sustainability benefits analysis to the 
industry in question. This type of limitation may severely limit the types 
of agreements companies are permitted to enter into because the 
agreements would have to have an impact on the specific industry. But it 
would be closer in line with Supreme Court precedent disallowing 
procompetitive justifications outside of the industry in question.300 
Take the automakers’ agreement as an example of how this kind of 
analysis could work. Imagine that the four car manufacturers had agreed 
amongst themselves to increase emissions standards rather than each 
independently conferring with California. Under current antitrust law, it 
is unlikely that this agreement would be illegal per se because it does not 
explicitly fix prices or reduce quantity. But under a rule of reason or quick 
look analysis, the agreement would almost certainly fail. Courts would 
first examine whether the automakers have market power and whether the 
agreement has anticompetitive effects. The four automakers at issue here 
likely have market power,301 and it would be fairly simple for the 
government to argue that the agreement would have anticompetitive 
effects—the agreement could increase the price of automobiles and 
reduce the number of options on the market. Assuming the court found 
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anticompetitive effects, the automakers would then have the opportunity 
to put forth procompetitive justifications. Under current antitrust law, it is 
hard to imagine what those procompetitive justifications could be. 
Increased innovation may represent the most effective argument, but 
because the automakers would not actually add a new type of product to 
the market, that argument would likely be unsuccessful. 
In contrast, if Congress granted an exemption similar to the Dutch 
guidelines, such an agreement could survive antitrust scrutiny if it met the 
four requirements. First, the companies would have to show, 
quantitatively, that the agreement would result in lower CO2 emissions. 
Given the evidence of vehicles’ sizeable contribution to CO2 emissions,302 
that data likely exists. Second, the automakers would have to show that 
their consumers would equitably share in the benefits. Consumers would 
certainly stand to benefit from this agreement. Not only could reduced 
auto emissions improve air quality and help slow climate change,303 but 
car consumers could save money on gas.304 Third, as in current rule of 
reason analysis, the companies would have to show that the agreement 
was no more restrictive than necessary to achieve the benefits in question. 
This may be a fact-specific inquiry, but with some further guidance, 
companies could narrowly tailor their agreements to satisfy the 
third factor. 
The fourth factor—whether a substantial number of products would be 
eliminated—would likely be the most difficult for the automakers to meet. 
Analyzing this factor may depend on the specific terms of the agreement. 
But, again, companies may be able to craft agreements to satisfy this 
factor. For example, if the concern was that increasing auto emissions 
standards would eliminate nearly all pickup trucks from the market, the 
agreement could be crafted with different emission standards for sedans, 
SUVs, vans, and pickup trucks. Having guidelines like those proposed in 
the Netherlands would allow companies to craft their agreements to meet 
the four required factors while still allowing them to work together to 
address climate change. 
The most complicated part of implementing this exemption would be 
the way in which courts could weigh “public interest” factors with 
economic ones. The benefit of the Dutch model is that it builds in less 
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arbitrary standards than those in the South African and Australian models 
because of its focus on quantitative data. In fact, the Dutch model fits quite 
well within the rule of reason analysis currently used by American courts 
because it could function as a burden-shifting analysis just like the rule of 
reason. To further address the arbitrariness problem, the exemption could 
require the sustainability benefits to meet a certain threshold, such as 
reducing carbon emissions by a certain percentage. In contrast, a simple 
public interest test would force judges to weigh sustainability against one 
of the main purposes of antitrust law—preventing unfair competition. 
Using the Dutch model avoids some of the arbitrariness inherent in the 
public interest test analysis. 
Not only could this exemption fit cleanly into current antitrust law, but 
it also could be crafted to comply with the American Bar Association’s 
guidelines for creating antitrust exemptions.305 First, Congress could 
effectively consider the potential impact of the exemption on consumer 
welfare given the wealth of information on the effects of carbon 
emissions.306 Second, by including the two alterations mentioned above, 
Congress could craft a narrow exemption to provide that “competition is 
reduced only to the minimum extent necessary.”307 Third, the goals of the 
exemption—curbing climate change—almost certainly outweigh the 
goals of antitrust law because climate change amounts to an existential 
crisis that will annihilate the planet if left unaddressed. And finally, 
Congress could easily include a sunset provision in the exemption. 
Although addressing climate change is vital to the future of the world 
as we know it, some will likely argue that antitrust law is not the 
appropriate avenue for tackling the problem. While companies could 
plausibly make substantial progress in the climate crisis if allowed to enter 
into agreements such as the one entered into by the automakers in 
California, permitting agreements among competitors comes with a risk 
of increased cartel behavior.308 But if we fail to curb climate change, 
industry will cease to exist altogether, along with the rest of our planet. 
It could also be politically challenging for Congress to pass such an 
exemption. However, a bill aimed at protecting climate change 
agreements from the reaches of antitrust law may be more plausible than 
an omnibus climate change initiative. The bill would not involve spending 
money or additional restrictions on businesses, which could make it easier 
to pass than other climate change laws. Thus, even if antitrust law was not 
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originally intended to encompass moral or social considerations, the dire 
need for action on carbon emissions, and the greater feasibility of an 
antitrust exemption, indicate that antitrust law may, in fact, be a fitting 
avenue for combatting climate change. 
B. Litigants Should Frame Sustainability Agreements in 
Economic Terms 
Absent a congressional exemption, litigants should frame their 
sustainability agreements in economic terms to effectively survive 
antitrust scrutiny. Courts widely agree that non-economic factors cannot 
be considered in antitrust analysis, but litigants could attempt to frame 
climate change considerations as economic in nature. Cases like NCAA, 
where the litigants framed the uniqueness of the NCAA organization and 
its capitalization of amateurism in economic terms, should be used as 
models for how to effectively frame sustainability agreements as 
economic in nature.309 
To better explain this type of framing, imagine four coffee shops, one 
on each corner of a busy intersection. The four companies want to invest 
in sustainably sourced coffee, but it is more expensive than the coffee they 
each currently buy. Loyal consumers, even if prices increased at one shop 
and not others, would continue to frequent their favorite shop—valuing 
aesthetic, crafty baristas, or something else over price. Thrifty consumers 
would switch to a less expensive shop. But environmentally conscious 
consumers may choose to switch to the more environmentally friendly 
shop—valuing sustainable practices over the increased cost. To avoid 
losing customers, the four shops agree to all purchase the sustainably 
sourced coffee. 
This type of agreement would be highly suspect under a traditional 
antitrust analysis, but not per se unlawful. If challenged, the shops could 
attempt to frame the sustainability benefits in an economic way. For 
example, the shops could argue that coffee trees may go extinct if the 
beans are not sustainably sourced. Thus, the entire coffee industry runs 
the risk of disappearing if they do not make environmentally conscious 
decisions. The coffee shops could even cite to scientific studies showing 
the risk to the coffee industry of current farming practices to support their 
argument.310 This type of legal approach is not guaranteed to work, though 
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it would fall closely in line with cases like NCAA, where the court viewed 
an arguably social consideration—framed in economic terms—as a 
procompetitive justification. Given the lack of precedent in the climate 
change context, the result of such an argument may depend heavily on the 
court and the effectiveness of the economic framing. 
Capitalizing on Supreme Court precedent like NCAA could present a 
strong framework for litigants seeking to survive antitrust scrutiny. 
Framing an environmental agreement as economically procompetitive 
may help the agreement survive difficult case law such as National 
Society of Professional Engineers and Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
absent an explicit congressional exemption. In dealing with antitrust 
challenges to sustainability agreements, litigants should highlight the 
economic effects that climate change is likely to have on the relevant 
market and industry. 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment has emphasized the importance of allowing corporate 
collaboration on climate change while maintaining the legitimate goals of 
antitrust law. Courts have historically been the primary driver for change 
in antitrust law, but courts are not best suited to address sustainability 
agreements because of a long line of precedent disallowing moral and 
ethical considerations in antitrust jurisprudence. Thus, Congress should 
create an exemption in antitrust law for agreements among companies 
aimed at curbing climate change. Congress should use the new Dutch 
guidelines to craft an antitrust exemption for sustainability agreements 
that is narrowly tailored to mitigate the risk of cartel behavior. Absent a 
sustainability exemption, companies who find themselves on the wrong 
side of an antitrust challenge should frame the agreement in economic 
terms, emphasizing the impact climate change will have on their specific 
market and industry. Perhaps antitrust law will one day evolve to 
encompass environmental concerns but, in the meantime, litigants should 
not hesitate to underscore the extreme economic effects climate change is 
destined to have on many industries. 
 
